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This site presents my work in philosophy. It contains published articles, preprints , as well as books. The texts relate to analytic philosophy, semiotics, the study of concepts, cognition and psycho-pathological philosophy.

My works are mainly in analytic philosophy and consist of proposed solutions to some philosophical paradoxes : the Doomsday argument, Hempel’s paradox, Goodman ‘s paradox, the surprise examination paradox, the Sleeping Beauty problem, but also the Black-Leslie paradox of the spheres, etc.. A conceptual tool, the n-universes, which are useful for the study of philosophical problems is also presented.

There are also texts on semiotics and the study of concepts. These texts are based on a specific conceptual tool : the matrices of concepts. Recent applications to the dialectical plan, to  paradigm analysis of a corpus of proverbs , to the analysis of the love-hate indifference triplet of concepts are also presented.

Finally, several texts relate to cognition and cognitive distortions. Additions to the theory of cognitive distortions are exposed, and their applications in the field of psycho-pathological philosophy.

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A Solution to Goodman’s Paradox

goodmanPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in Dialogue Vol. 40, Winter 2001, pp. 99-123 under the title “Une Solution pour le Paradoxe de Goodman”.
In the classical version of Goodman’s paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of -universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given -universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in an -universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an -universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution.

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A Solution to Goodman’s Paradox

Paul Franceschi

p.franceschi@univ-corse.fr

originally published in Dialogue, winter 2001, vol. 40, pp. 99-123

ABSTRACT: In the classical version of Goodman’s paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of n-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given n-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution.

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A Logical Defence of Maher’s Model of Polythematic Delusions

Noahs-Ark-delusionEnglish translation of a paper published in French in Philosophiques, autumn 2008, under the title “Une défense logique du modèle de Maher pour les délires polythématiques”.

In this paper, we proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequation with Brendan Maher’s account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is respectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model.

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On a Class of Concepts

matPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in Semiotica, vol. 139 (1-4), 2002, 211-226, under the title “Une Classe de Concepts”.

This article describes the construction, of philosophical essence, of the class of the matrices of concepts, whose structure and properties present an interest in several fields. The paper emphasises the applications in the field of paradigmatic analysis of the resulting taxonomy and proposes it as an alternative to the semiotic square put forth by Greimas.

This paper is cited in:

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On a Class of Concepts

Classically, in the discussion relating to polar opposites1, one primarily directs his interest to the common and lexicalized concepts, i.e. for which there exists a corresponding word in the vocabulary inherent to a given language. This way of proceeding tends to generate several disadvantages. One of them resides in the fact (i) that such concepts are likely to vary from one language to another, from one culture to another. Another (ii) of the resulting problems is that certain lexicalized concepts reveal a nuance which is either meliorative or pejorative, with degrees in this type of nuances which prove difficult to appreciate. Finally, another problem (iii) lies in the fact that certain concepts, according to semiotic analysis2 are regarded as marked with regard to others concepts which are unmarked, the status of unmarked concept conferring a kind of precedence, of pre-eminence to the concepts in question.

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Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Over-generalisation and Labeling

English translation of a paper published in French in the Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2009, 19-4, pages 136-140 under the title “Théorie des distorsions cognitives : la sur-généralisation et l’étiquetage”.

In a previous article (Complements to a theory of cognitive distorsions, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we introduced some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements allow to define the general cognitive distortions as well as the specific cognitive distortions. This model is extended here to the description of two other classical cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling. The definition of the two latter cognitive distortions is based on prior differentiation between three levels of reasoning: primary, secondary and ternary pathogenic arguments. The latter analysis also leads to define two other cognitive distortions which insert themselves into this framework: ill-grounded inductive projection and confirmation bias.

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Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Personalisation

English translation of a paper published in French in the Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2010, 20-2, pages 51-55 under the title “Théorie des distorsions cognitives : la personnalisation”.

In a previous paper (Complements to a theory of cognitive distorsionsJournal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements led to distinguish between the general cognitive distortions (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one pole, minimisation, maximisation) and the specific cognitive distortions (disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction, catastrophism). By also distinguishing between three levels of reasoning – the instantiation stage, the interpretation stage and the generalisation stage – we did also define two other cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling (Théorie des distorsions cognitives : la sur-généralisation et l’étiquetageJournal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2009). We currently extend this model to another classical cognitive distortion: personalisation.

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Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Application to Generalised Anxiety Disorder

grad-tag4-bw-bakEnglish translation and postprint (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French under the title “Théorie des distorsions cognitives : application à l’anxiété généralisée” in the Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2008, 18, pp. 127-131.
This article follows the contribution to the general theory of cognitive distortions exposed in “Complements to a theory of cognitive distorsions” (Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007). The elements described, namely the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, are applied here to generalised anxiety disorder. On the one hand, these elements allow to describe the cognitive distortions which are specific to generalised anxiety disorder, consistent with recent work emphasising the role played uncertain situations relative to future events. On the second hand, they allow to define a type of structured reasoning, of inductive nature, which leads to the formation and maintenance of anxious ideas.

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Probabilistic Situations for Goodmanian N-universes

image22A paper appeared (2006) in French in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 31, pages 123-141, under the title “Situations probabilistes pour n-univers goodmaniens.”

I proceed to describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe first how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modelling of complex probabilistic situations and fits more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds.

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Probabilistic Situations for Goodmanian N-universes

The n-universes were introduced in Franceschi (2001, 2002) in the context of the study of the probabilistic situations relating to several paradoxes which are currently the object of intensive studies in the field of analytical philosophy: Goodman’s paradox and the Doomsday Argument. The scope of the present article is twofold: on one hand, to describe how modelling within the n-universes allows to extend the properties of the classical probability spaces used in probability theory, by providing at the same time a finer modelling of some probabilistic situations and a better support for intuition; on the other hand, to show how the use of n-universes allows to simplify considerably the study of complex probabilistic situations such as those which appear in the study of paradoxes.

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Post-publication of a review of John Leslie, Infinite Minds

Review of John Leslie, Infinite Minds, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 234 pages.1john leslie infinite minds

 Paul Franceschi

 University of Corsica

 

Post-publication of the review appeared in Philosophiques, Volume 30, number 2, Autumn 2003

Infinite Minds is the fourth book of John Leslie, which follows Value and Existence (1979), Universes (1989) and The End of the World (1996). Infinite Minds presents a very rich content, and covers a number of particularly varied subjects. Among these latter, one can notably mention: omniscience, the problem of Evil, the fine-tuning argument, observational selection effects, the identity of indiscernables, time, infiniteness, the nature of consciousness.

The book places itself clearly within the field of speculative philosophy. And Leslie is primarily concerned here with considerations not of rigorous demonstration, but rather of plausibility and of coherence. He thus does not hesitate sometimes to attribute a rather weak probability to certain assertions.

Some readers may be rebutted from the beginning by the counter-intuitive assertion that galaxies, planets, animals, but also each of us and our surrounding objects, are mere structures among divine thoughts. One can think that such an assertion has motivated the commentary placed on the book’s cover by a reader from Oxford University Press, according to which it may be difficult to believe that the universe is such that the author describes it. This was also my primary reaction. But if certain readers were to draw from that a hasty conclusion, they would miss then, I think, what constitutes the hidden treasure of the book. Because Infinite Minds resembles a sumptuous temple, whose access however is dissimulated by a gate which looks poorly attractive. Those who will not cross the door, rebutted by the aspect of this latter, will not have the occasion to contemplate the hidden treasures that the book contains. Because the book presents an overall deep structure and coherence, based on the consistency of the author’s pantheist conception of the universe with our current most advanced scientific views with regard to cosmology, physics, as well as with the solutions to several contemporary philosophical problems. To show synthetically how a pantheist vision of the world can cohere with our most recent views with regard to multiple universes, physics and quantum computer science, inasmuch as with relativity theory and recent discussions relating to omniscience, the problem of Evil, the fine-tuning argument, observational selection effects, etc. appears both an immense and deeply original task.

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