The dual poles can de defined as neutral concepts, which come in pairs, and are such that each of them is defined as the opposite of the other. For example, internal can be defined as the opposite of external and symmetrically, external can be defined as the contrary of internal. In a sense, there is no primitive notion here and neither A nor Ā of the dual poles can be regarded as the primitive notion.
Examples of dual poles are: static, dynamic, internal, external, qualitative, quantitative, absolute, relative, diachronic, synchronic, etc..
The dual poles are neutral concepts, as well as simple qualities. They also differ from vague notions.
The dual poles are neutral concepts, i.e. concepts that present no ameliorative or pejorative nuance. In this sense, external, internal, concrete, abstract, etc.., are dual poles, unlike concepts such as beautiful, ugly, brave, which present either a ameliorative or pejorative shade, and are therefore non-neutral, since beautiful has a positive connotation and ugly has a pejorative connotation.
The dual poles of a given duality correspond to simple qualities, as opposed to composite qualities.
Dual poles are also different from vague objects. Dual poles and vague objects, first, have certain properties in common. Indeed, vague objects come in pairs in the same way as dual poles. Moreover, vague concepts are classically considered as having an extension and an anti-extension, which are mutually exclusive. Such a feature is also shared by the dual poles.
A first difference between dual poles and vague concepts (i) lies in the fact that the union of the extension and the anti-extension of vague concepts is not exhaustive in the sense that they admit of borderline cases (and also borderline cases of borderline cases, etc., giving rise to a hierarchy of higher-order vagueness of order n), which is a penumbra zone. Conversely, the dual poles do not necessarily have such a characteristic. Indeed, the union of the dual poles can be either exhaustive or non-exhaustive. For example, the abstract/concrete duality is then intuitively exhaustive, since there does not seem to exist any objects that are neither abstract nor concrete. The same goes for the vague/precise duality: intuitively, there does no exist indeed objects that are neither vague nor precise, and that would belong to an intermediate category. Hence, there are dual poles whose extension and anti-extension turns out to be exhaustive, unlike vague concepts, such as the two poles of the abstract/concrete duality.
It is worth mentioning, second, another difference (ii) between dual poles and vague objects. In effect, dual poles are simple qualities, while vague objects may consist of simple or compound qualities. There exist indeed some vague concepts which are termed multi-dimensional vague objects, such as the notion of vehicle, of machine, etc..
A final difference between the two categories of objects (iii) lies in the fact that some dual poles have an inherently precise nature. This is particularly the case of the individual/collective duality, which is susceptible to give rise to a very accurate definition.
Further reading: Elements of dialectical contextualism
This text is part of a book under construction. (c) Paul Franceschi