The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem: the Dialectical Contextualist’s Standpoint

chap31Preprint. I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step-by-step. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several references classes: aware-simulations, rough simulations and cyborg-type simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature.

This preprint supersedes my preceding work on the Simulation argument. Please do not cite previous work.

Comments are welcome.

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December 2016: An updated version of my analysis of the Simulation Argument has appeared in the canadian Philosophiques journal (in French) under the
title: L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique

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Elements of Dialectical Contextualism

Paolo_Veronese - DialecticsPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of  an article appeared in French in the collective book (pages 581-608) written on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Pascal Engel.

In what follows, I strive to present the elements of a philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I proceed first to define the elements of this doctrine: dualities and polar contraries, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I emphasize then the special importance of this doctrine in one specific field of meta-philosophy: the methodology for solving philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I describe several applications of this methodology on the following paradoxes: Hempel’s paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday Argument.

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Elements of Dialectical Contextualism

In what follows, I will endeavour to present the elements of a specific philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I will try first to clarify the elements that characterise this doctrine, especially the dualities and dual poles, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I will proceed then to describe its interest at a meta-philosophical level, especially as a methodology to assist in the resolution of philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I will describe an application of this methodology to the analysis of the following philosophical paradoxes: Hempel’s paradox , the surprise examination paradox and the Doomday Argument.

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A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem

eub-sbPreprint published on the PhilSci archive.

I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the hyper-entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the hyper-entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the hyper-entanglement urn have ontologically different properties from normal ones. In this context, drawing a red ball (a Monday-waking) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability, depending on whether one considers “balls-as-colour” or “balls-as-object”. This leads to a two-sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem.

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A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem

1. The hyper-entanglement urn

Let us consider the following experiment. In front of you is an urn. The experimenter asks you to study very carefully the properties of the balls that are in the urn. You go up then to the urn and begin to examine its content carefully. You notice first that the urn contains only red or green balls. By curiosity, you decide to take a sample of a red ball in the urn. Surprisingly, you notice that while you pick up this red ball, another ball, but a green one, also moves simultaneously. You decide then to replace the red ball in the urn and you notice that immediately, the latter green ball also springs back in the urn. Intrigued, you decide then to catch this green ball. You notice then that the red ball also goes out of the urn at the same time. Furthermore, while you replace the green ball in the urn, the red ball also springs back at the same time at its initial position in the urn. You decide then to withdraw another red ball from the urn. But while it goes out of the urn, nothing else occurs. Taken aback, you decide then to undertake a systematic and rigorous study of all the balls in the urn.

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A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

eub-sep

English translation of a paper appeared in French in Philosophiques 2005, vol. 32, pages 399-421 (with minor changes with regard to the published version).

This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution and Hall’s reduction apply to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the version of the paradox based on the disjoint structure.

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A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

I shall present in what follows a new conceptual framework to solve the surprise examination paradox (henceforth, SEP), in the sense that it reorganizes, by adapting them, several elements of solution described in the literature. The solution suggested here rests primarily on the following elements: (i) a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox; (ii) the introduction of a matrix definition, which is used as support with several variations of the paradox; (iii) the distinction between a conjoint and a disjoint definition of the cases of surprise and of non-surprise, leading to two structurally different notions of surprise.

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An Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

intro-phi-a-bookIn this book, Paul Franceschi provides us with an introduction to analytic philosophy. In a concrete way, he chooses to describe forty paradoxes, arguments or philosophical issues that represent so many challenges for contemporary philosophy and human intelligence, for some paradoxes of millennial origin—such as the Liar or the sorites paradox—are still unresolved in the present day. Some other philosophical puzzles, however—such as the Doomsday argument—appeared only recently in the literature. The author strives to introduce us clearly to each of these problems as well as to major attempts that have been formulated to solve them.

“I’m really impressed by this very neat and stimulating book. I highly recommend it both to students for pedagogy and general culture (prisoner’s dilemma, twin-earth, etc.), and to professionals as well for the reference tool and even more generally to those who like to think.”

Julien Dutant, Philotropes, Philosophical blog

The Kindle version is also available.

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A Polar Concept Argument for the Existence of Abstracta

Preprint. In this paper, I present a polar concept argument for the existence of abstract objects. After recalling the fundamentals of the debate about the existence of abstracta, I present in a detailed way the argument for the existence of abstracta. I offer two different variations of the argument: one, deductive and the other, inductive. The argument rests primarily on the fact that our universe is well-balanced. This well-balanced property results from the fact that all instantiable polar dualities are instantiated. Hence, the abstract pole of the abstract/concrete duality must also be exemplified. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument.

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A Polar Concept Argument for the Existence of Abstracta

There are several famous problems about abstract entities. One of them consists of whether there exist any abstract objects. A second issue is concerned with the definition of which sorts of entities are genuinely abstract. A third issue relates to whether the abstract/concrete duality is exhaustive or not. The purpose of this paper is to address the first of these issues and to describe a polar concept argument that entails the existence of abstracta. Before stating the argument in detail and reviewing several objections that can be raised against it, it is worth recalling preliminarily the fundamentals of the debate about the existence of abstracta.

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This site presents my work in philosophy. It contains published articles, preprints , as well as books. The texts relate to analytic philosophy, semiotics, the study of concepts, cognition and psycho-pathological philosophy.

My works are mainly in analytic philosophy and consist of proposed solutions to some philosophical paradoxes : the Doomsday argument, Hempel’s paradox, Goodman ‘s paradox, the surprise examination paradox, the Sleeping Beauty problem, but also the Black-Leslie paradox of the spheres, etc.. A conceptual tool, the n-universes, which are useful for the study of philosophical problems is also presented.

There are also texts on semiotics and the study of concepts. These texts are based on a specific conceptual tool : the matrices of concepts. Recent applications to the dialectical plan, to  paradigm analysis of a corpus of proverbs , to the analysis of the love-hate indifference triplet of concepts are also presented.

Finally, several texts relate to cognition and cognitive distortions. Additions to the theory of cognitive distortions are exposed, and their applications in the field of psycho-pathological philosophy.

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A Solution to Goodman’s Paradox

goodmanPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in Dialogue Vol. 40, Winter 2001, pp. 99-123 under the title “Une Solution pour le Paradoxe de Goodman”.
In the classical version of Goodman’s paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of -universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given -universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in an -universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an -universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution.

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A Solution to Goodman’s Paradox

Paul Franceschi

p.franceschi@univ-corse.fr

originally published in Dialogue, winter 2001, vol. 40, pp. 99-123

ABSTRACT: In the classical version of Goodman’s paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of n-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given n-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution.

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Probabilistic Situations for Goodmanian N-universes

image22A paper appeared (2006) in French in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 31, pages 123-141, under the title “Situations probabilistes pour n-univers goodmaniens.”

I proceed to describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe first how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modelling of complex probabilistic situations and fits more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds.

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Probabilistic Situations for Goodmanian N-universes

The n-universes were introduced in Franceschi (2001, 2002) in the context of the study of the probabilistic situations relating to several paradoxes which are currently the object of intensive studies in the field of analytical philosophy: Goodman’s paradox and the Doomsday Argument. The scope of the present article is twofold: on one hand, to describe how modelling within the n-universes allows to extend the properties of the classical probability spaces used in probability theory, by providing at the same time a finer modelling of some probabilistic situations and a better support for intuition; on the other hand, to show how the use of n-universes allows to simplify considerably the study of complex probabilistic situations such as those which appear in the study of paradoxes.

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