The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem: the Dialectical Contextualist’s Standpoint

chap31Preprint. I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step-by-step. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several references classes: aware-simulations, rough simulations and cyborg-type simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature.

This preprint supersedes my preceding work on the Simulation argument. Please do not cite previous work.

Comments are welcome.

line_1

December 2016: An updated version of my analysis of the Simulation Argument has appeared in the canadian Philosophiques journal (in French) under the
title: L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique

read more

Elements of Dialectical Contextualism

Paolo_Veronese - DialecticsPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of  an article appeared in French in the collective book (pages 581-608) written on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Pascal Engel.

In what follows, I strive to present the elements of a philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I proceed first to define the elements of this doctrine: dualities and polar contraries, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I emphasize then the special importance of this doctrine in one specific field of meta-philosophy: the methodology for solving philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I describe several applications of this methodology on the following paradoxes: Hempel’s paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday Argument.

line_1

Elements of Dialectical Contextualism

In what follows, I will endeavour to present the elements of a specific philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as dialectical contextualism. I will try first to clarify the elements that characterise this doctrine, especially the dualities and dual poles, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I will proceed then to describe its interest at a meta-philosophical level, especially as a methodology to assist in the resolution of philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I will describe an application of this methodology to the analysis of the following philosophical paradoxes: Hempel’s paradox , the surprise examination paradox and the Doomday Argument.

read more

An Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

intro-phi-a-bookIn this book, Paul Franceschi provides us with an introduction to analytic philosophy. In a concrete way, he chooses to describe forty paradoxes, arguments or philosophical issues that represent so many challenges for contemporary philosophy and human intelligence, for some paradoxes of millennial origin—such as the Liar or the sorites paradox—are still unresolved in the present day. Some other philosophical puzzles, however—such as the Doomsday argument—appeared only recently in the literature. The author strives to introduce us clearly to each of these problems as well as to major attempts that have been formulated to solve them.

“I’m really impressed by this very neat and stimulating book. I highly recommend it both to students for pedagogy and general culture (prisoner’s dilemma, twin-earth, etc.), and to professionals as well for the reference tool and even more generally to those who like to think.”

Julien Dutant, Philotropes, Philosophical blog

The Kindle version is also available.

read more

A Polar Concept Argument for the Existence of Abstracta

Preprint. In this paper, I present a polar concept argument for the existence of abstract objects. After recalling the fundamentals of the debate about the existence of abstracta, I present in a detailed way the argument for the existence of abstracta. I offer two different variations of the argument: one, deductive and the other, inductive. The argument rests primarily on the fact that our universe is well-balanced. This well-balanced property results from the fact that all instantiable polar dualities are instantiated. Hence, the abstract pole of the abstract/concrete duality must also be exemplified. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument.

line_1

A Polar Concept Argument for the Existence of Abstracta

There are several famous problems about abstract entities. One of them consists of whether there exist any abstract objects. A second issue is concerned with the definition of which sorts of entities are genuinely abstract. A third issue relates to whether the abstract/concrete duality is exhaustive or not. The purpose of this paper is to address the first of these issues and to describe a polar concept argument that entails the existence of abstracta. Before stating the argument in detail and reviewing several objections that can be raised against it, it is worth recalling preliminarily the fundamentals of the debate about the existence of abstracta.

read more

A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

DA-figureA paper published (2009) in English in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 34, pages 263-278 (with significant changes with regard to the preprint).

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast with, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Doomsday argument. I argue then that the resulting two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.

line_1

A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

In what follows, I will endeavor to present a solution to the problem arising from the Doomsday argument (DA). The solution thus described constitutes a third way out, compared to, on the one hand, the approach of the promoters of DA (Leslie 1993 and 1996) and on the other hand, the solution recommended by its detractors (Eckhardt 1993 and 1997, Sowers 2002).i

read more

The Doomsday Argument and Hempel’s Problem

hempelPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol.29, July 1999, pp. 139-56 under the title “Comment l’Urne de Carter et Leslie se Déverse dans celle de Hempel”.
I begin by describing a solution to Hempel’s Problem. I recall, second, the solution to the Doomsday Argument described in my previous Une Solution pour l’Argument de l’Apocalypse (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1998-2) and remark that both solutions are based on a similar line of reasoning. I show thirdly that the Doomsday Argument can be reduced to the core of Hempel’s Problem.

This paper is cited in:

Koji Sawa, Junki Yokokawa and Tatsuji Takahashi (2013) Logical Equivalence: Symmetric and Asymmetric Features, Symmetry: Culture and Science, Vol. 24, No. x.

Milan M. Cirkovic, A Resource Letter on Physical eschatology, Am.J.Phys. 71 (2003) 122-133

Nick Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, Routledge (2002)

read more