A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

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English translation of a paper appeared in French in Philosophiques 2005, vol. 32, pages 399-421 (with minor changes with regard to the published version).

This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution and Hall’s reduction apply to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the version of the paradox based on the disjoint structure.

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A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

I shall present in what follows a new conceptual framework to solve the surprise examination paradox (henceforth, SEP), in the sense that it reorganizes, by adapting them, several elements of solution described in the literature. The solution suggested here rests primarily on the following elements: (i) a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox; (ii) the introduction of a matrix definition, which is used as support with several variations of the paradox; (iii) the distinction between a conjoint and a disjoint definition of the cases of surprise and of non-surprise, leading to two structurally different notions of surprise.

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An Introduction to Analytic Philosophy

intro-phi-a-bookIn this book, Paul Franceschi provides us with an introduction to analytic philosophy. In a concrete way, he chooses to describe forty paradoxes, arguments or philosophical issues that represent so many challenges for contemporary philosophy and human intelligence, for some paradoxes of millennial origin—such as the Liar or the sorites paradox—are still unresolved in the present day. Some other philosophical puzzles, however—such as the Doomsday argument—appeared only recently in the literature. The author strives to introduce us clearly to each of these problems as well as to major attempts that have been formulated to solve them.

“I’m really impressed by this very neat and stimulating book. I highly recommend it both to students for pedagogy and general culture (prisoner’s dilemma, twin-earth, etc.), and to professionals as well for the reference tool and even more generally to those who like to think.”

Julien Dutant, Philotropes, Philosophical blog

The Kindle version is also available.

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A Logical Defence of Maher’s Model of Polythematic Delusions

Noahs-Ark-delusionEnglish translation of a paper published in French in Philosophiques, autumn 2008, under the title “Une défense logique du modèle de Maher pour les délires polythématiques”.

In this paper, we proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequation with Brendan Maher’s account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is respectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model.

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Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Application to Generalised Anxiety Disorder

grad-tag4-bw-bakEnglish translation and postprint (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French under the title “Théorie des distorsions cognitives : application à l’anxiété généralisée” in the Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2008, 18, pp. 127-131.
This article follows the contribution to the general theory of cognitive distortions exposed in “Complements to a theory of cognitive distorsions” (Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007). The elements described, namely the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, are applied here to generalised anxiety disorder. On the one hand, these elements allow to describe the cognitive distortions which are specific to generalised anxiety disorder, consistent with recent work emphasising the role played uncertain situations relative to future events. On the second hand, they allow to define a type of structured reasoning, of inductive nature, which leads to the formation and maintenance of anxious ideas.

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