The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem: the Dialectical Contextualist’s Standpoint

chap31Preprint. I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step-by-step. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several references classes: aware-simulations, rough simulations and cyborg-type simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature.

This preprint supersedes my preceding work on the Simulation argument. Please do not cite previous work.

Comments are welcome.

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December 2016: An updated version of my analysis of the Simulation Argument has appeared in the canadian Philosophiques journal (in French) under the
title: L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique

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A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

DA-figureA paper published (2009) in English in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 34, pages 263-278 (with significant changes with regard to the preprint).

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast with, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Doomsday argument. I argue then that the resulting two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.

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A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

In what follows, I will endeavor to present a solution to the problem arising from the Doomsday argument (DA). The solution thus described constitutes a third way out, compared to, on the one hand, the approach of the promoters of DA (Leslie 1993 and 1996) and on the other hand, the solution recommended by its detractors (Eckhardt 1993 and 1997, Sowers 2002).i

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The Doomsday Argument and Hempel’s Problem

hempelPosprint in English (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol.29, July 1999, pp. 139-56 under the title “Comment l’Urne de Carter et Leslie se Déverse dans celle de Hempel”.
I begin by describing a solution to Hempel’s Problem. I recall, second, the solution to the Doomsday Argument described in my previous Une Solution pour l’Argument de l’Apocalypse (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1998-2) and remark that both solutions are based on a similar line of reasoning. I show thirdly that the Doomsday Argument can be reduced to the core of Hempel’s Problem.

This paper is cited in:

Koji Sawa, Junki Yokokawa and Tatsuji Takahashi (2013) Logical Equivalence: Symmetric and Asymmetric Features, Symmetry: Culture and Science, Vol. 24, No. x.

Milan M. Cirkovic, A Resource Letter on Physical eschatology, Am.J.Phys. 71 (2003) 122-133

Nick Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, Routledge (2002)

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